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Abstract8
New Keynesian analysis relies heavily on two workhorse models of nominal in-9
ertia - due to (Calvo, 1983) and (Rotemberg, 1982), respectively - to generate a10
meaningful role for monetary policy. These are often used interchangeably since11
they imply an isomorphic linearized Phillips curve and, if the steady-state is effi-12
cient, the same policy conclusions. In this paper we compute time-consistent optimal13
monetary policy in the benchmark New Keynesian model containing each form of14
price stickiness using global solution techniques. We find that, due to an offsetting15
endogenous impact on average markups, the inflation bias problem under Calvo16
contracts is often significantly greater than under Rotemberg pricing, despite the17
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1 Introduction24
Mainstream macroeconomic analysis of both monetary and fiscal policy relies heavily on25
the New Keynesian model. The distinguishing feature of this model, relative to a more26
classical approach, is that it contains some form of nominal inertia. This allows monetary27
policy to have real effects, and widens the degree of interaction between monetary and28
fiscal policies, since monetary policy affects both the size of the tax base and real debt29
service costs in such models. Typically, one of two workhorse forms of nominal inertia30
are adopted in the literature - Calvo (1983) price contracts, and Rotemberg (1982) price31
adjustment costs. In the former, firms are only able to adjust their prices after random32
intervals of time, such that, outside of a zero inflation steady-state there will be a costly33
dispersion of prices across firms. In the latter, firms behave symmetrically in setting the34
same price but they face quadratic adjustment costs in doing so. Despite this fundamen-35
tal difference, researchers have typically treated the two approaches as being equivalent36
since the New Keynesian Phillips Curves (NKPC) they imply are, to a first order of ap-37
proximation, isomorphic when linearized around a zero inflation steady state. Moreover,38
when that zero inflation steady-state is also efficient (that is, it matches the output level39
that would be chosen by a benevolent social planner) it can be shown that the second-40
order approximation to welfare rewritten in terms of inflation and the output gap is also41
the same across the two approaches (see Nistico, 2007). Under these conditions, to a first42
order of approximation, the two approaches would yield the same policy implications.43
For these reasons the two approaches have largely been treated as synonymous within44
the New Keynesian literature.45
However, despite this broad consensus, there are examples within the literature where46
the two approaches do differ. The first is where the steady-state around which we ap-47
proximate the New Keynesian economy is not efficient. For example, Lombardo and48
Vestin (2008) relax the assumption of Nistico (2007) and consider the second order ap-49
proximation to welfare when the steady state is not efficient. They find that the costs of50
such inefficiencies are typically larger in the Calvo economy. This mirrors the results in51
Damjanovic and Nolan (2011).52
Moreover, there appears to be significant nonlinearities in the New Keynesian model53
which are affected by the size of the steady-state distortion, the degree of unindexed54
inflation and the type of nominal inertia adopted. For example, the trending inflation55
literature (see Ascari and Sbordone (2014) for a survey) finds that the presence of even a56
modest degree of (unindexed) steady-state inflation can radically overturn determinacy57
results, undermine the learnability of rational expectations equilibria, affect the monetary58
policy transmission mechanism and change the nature of optimal policy. In addition, these59
effects can differ across the two forms of nominal inertia (Ascari and Rossi, 2012), with the60
larger impact of trend inflation being felt under Calvo. The large costs of trend inflation61
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under Calvo is also reflected in the analysis of Damjanovic and Nolan (2010b) where the62
seigniorage maximizing rate of inflation is at double digit levels under Rotemberg pricing,63
but only single digits under Calvo. However, this evidence largely comes from studies64
which linearize such economies, either to a first- or second-order approximation, after65
allowing for such factors.66
In this paper we solve the benchmark New Keynesian model nonlinearly using the67
two standard approaches to model price stickiness. Since we are not imposing any kind68
of approximation around a steady-state, we can fully explore the nonlinearities inherent69
in the New Keynesian model and see clearly the extent to which the two approaches70
differ. Moreover, rather than consider the Ramsey problem or commitment to a simple71
monetary policy rule, we shall consider time-consistent optimal policy (commonly known72
as discretion). This in turn, given that we are not using any artificial devices to ensure73
the model’s steady-state being efficient, implies that we can measure the extent of the74
inflationary bias problem under the two forms of nominal inertia.1 In general, this paper75
helps us understand the nature of equilibrium without commitment - a property of mon-76
etary models that is less studied in the literature. To our knowledge, the current paper77
is the first to formally compare and contrast time-consistent optimal policy under the78
two forms of price-setting using global solution algorithms and therefore to assess how79
innocuous the choice of one form of price-setting over the other actually is.80
The inflationary bias problem is driven by a combination of the policy maker’s desire81
to increase an otherwise sub-optimally low level of output by inducing inflation surprises,82
and the fact that they cannot credibly commit not to do so. Economic agents anticipate83
such behavior and raise their inflation expectations until the policy maker is no longer84
tempted to introduce any inflation surprises. Essentially, inflation rises to a level which85
is sufficiently costly to prevent the policy maker from unexpectedly relaxing monetary86
policy, and society suffers the costs of higher inflation without reaping any benefits in87
terms of higher output. Since the costs of inflation are known to be higher under Calvo88
relative to Rotemberg pricing, ceteris paribus, it might be expected that this implies89
the inflationary bias problem is correspondingly lower under Calvo pricing. Our analy-90
sis shows that this is often not the case, and that the inflationary bias problem, while91
significant under both pricing mechanisms, can be much higher under Calvo pricing.92
The possibility of a worsening inflationary bias problem under Calvo arises because of93
the different average markup behavior under the two models. Under Calvo higher inflation94
causes those firms who are able to adjust prices in a particular period to raise that price95
in anticipation of not being able to readjust the price for a prolonged period despite the96
general rise in the price level. This leads to an increase in the average markup as inflation97
rises. In contrast, under Rotemberg all firms set the same price, period by period, but98
1It is well known that the optimal rate of inflation under commitment is zero, hence the inflation bias
is equal to the equilibrium rate of inflation under discretion.
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face adjustment costs in doing so. In discounting future profits they also discount future99
price adjustment costs. As a result, in the face of higher inflation the firms postpone some100
of the required price adjustment due to this discounting effect, which serves to reduce101
the average markup. Taking stock, the average markup and the associated distortion102
under Calvo is increasing in inflation but decreasing under Rotemberg. Other things103
being equal, the more the economy is distorted away from the efficient allocation, the104
larger the incentive of the policy maker to introduce surprise inflation. Accordingly,105
for a given degree of monopolistic competition which reduces output below its efficient106
level and thereby induces an inflation bias, this distinct average markup behavior further107
raises (lowers) the markup under Calvo (Rotemberg) and thereby worsens (improves)108
the inflationary bias problem, despite the fact that a given level of inflation is typically109
found to be more costly in welfare terms under Calvo. In addition, this difference in the110
endogenous markup effect under the two descriptions of nominal inertia is deepened as111
the degree of monopoly power and/or price stickiness is increased. Therefore, particularly112
as the flexible price markup is increased, the inflationary bias under Calvo will eventually113
rise above that observed under Rotemberg.114
There are some recent papers using global solution techniques which also consider115
optimal discretionary policy in the New Keynesian model under Calvo contracts - see116
Van Zandweghe and Wolman (2011) and Anderson et al. (2010), which is then extended117
in Ngo (2014) to allow for the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint.2 Solving nonlinear118
representations of an enriched New Keynesian model is typically far more computational-119
ly intensive than conventional perturbation methods, hence some authors instead adopt120
the Rotemberg description of price stickiness since this reduces the number of state vari-121
ables one must consider. For instance, Shibayama and Sunakawa (2012), Nakata (2013),122
Niemann et al. (2013) and Leeper et al. (2016) explore optimal policy in various New123
Keynesian models using Rotemberg pricing. In particular, Shibayama and Sunakawa124
(2012) use a nonlinear method to solve for the discretionary policy under Rotemberg125
pricing, but they do not compare and contrast the inflation bias implications between126
the two pricing mechanisms. A notable exception is Miao and Ngo (2016) which com-127
pares the dynamics of a fully nonlinear New Keynesian model under either Rotemberg or128
Calvo pricing in the presence of the ZLB constraint. They specify a simple Taylor rule129
for monetary policy and highlight how the government spending multiplier differs under130
both pricing, while we study the optimal discretionary monetary policy and focus on how131
2Assuming a rule-based description of policy, there are papers using global solution techniques to deal
with nonlinearities such as the ZLB constraint. Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015), Wieland (2013) and
Richter et al. (2013) explore equilibrium dynamics around the ZLB in variants of the New Keynesian
model which adopt Calvo price contracts. Other authors also consider issues relating to the ZLB in
models which use Rotemberg pricing, but also introduce extensions such as capital (see Gavin et al.
(2013), Braun and Korber (2011), Johannsen (2014)), consumption habits (Gust et al. (2012) and Aruoba
and Schorfheide (2013)), labor market frictions (Roulleau-Pasdeloup (2013)) or fiscal policy (Johannsen
(2014)).
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inflation bias differs between these two forms of nominal rigidities. Our common message132
is that Calvo and Rotemberg pricing can be far from equivalent in the nonlinear context.133
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic134
model under both Calvo and Rotemberg pricing. In section 3, we formulate the optimal135
discretionary policy problem with Rotemberg and Calvo pricing, respectively. In section136
4, we explain the solution method and calibration. In section 5, we present and discuss137
numerical results. We conclude in section 6.138
2 The Model139
This section describes the basic economic structure in our model.140
2.1 Households141
There are a continuum of households of size one. We shall assume complete asset markets,142
such that, through risk sharing, they will face the same budget constraint and make the143
same consumption plans. As a result, at period 0 the typical household will seek to144
maximize the following objective function,145
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct, Nt) (1)
where 0 < β < 1 denotes the discount factor, Ct and Nt are a consumption aggregate146
and labor supply at period t, respectively.147
The household purchases differentiated goods in a retail market and combines them148
into composite goods using a CES aggregator:149
Ct =
(∫ 1
0
Ct(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1
,  > 1 (2)
where Ct(j) is the demand for differentiated goods of type j.150
The budget constraint at time t is given by151 ∫ 1
0
Pt(j)Ct(j)dj + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Ξt +Dt +WtNt − Tt (3)
where Pt(j) is the nominal price of type j goods, Dt+1 is the nominal payoff of the152
nominal bonds portfolio held at the end of period t, Ξ is the representative household’s153
share of profits in the imperfectly competitive firms, W are wages, and T are lump-sum154
taxes/transfers.3 Qt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor for one period ahead payoffs.155
3In Section 5 we shall analyze cost push shocks driven by fluctuations in a revenue tax which shall
be rebated to households in a lump-sum form.
5
The labor market is perfectly competitive and wages are fully flexible.156
Households must first decide how to allocate a given level of expenditure across the157
various goods that are available. They do so by adjusting the share of a particular good158
in their consumption bundle to exploit any relative price differences—this minimizes the159
costs of consumption. The demand curve for each good j is,160
Ct(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Ct (4)
where the aggregate price level Pt is defined to be161
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt(j)
1−dj
) 1
1−
. (5)
The dynamic budget constraint at period t can therefore be rewritten as162
PtCt + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1} = Ξt +Dt +WtNt − Tt. (6)
The representative household’s decision problem can be dealt with in two stages.163
First, regardless of the level of Ct the household purchases the combination of individual164
goods that minimizes the cost of achieving this level of the composite good. Second,165
given the cost of achieving any given level of Ct, the household chooses Ct, Dt+1 and Nt166
optimally. We have solved the first stage problem above. For tractability, we assume that167
(1) takes the specific form168
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
)
. (7)
where σ > 0 is a risk aversion parameter and ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity169
of labor supply.170
We can then maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (6) to obtain, after171
taking expectations, the optimal allocation of consumption across time,172
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1, (8)
where Rt ≡ 1Et(Qt,t+1) is the gross nominal return on a riskless one period bond paying173
off a unit of currency in t + 1. This is the familiar consumption Euler equation which174
implies that consumers are attempting to smooth consumption over time such that the175
marginal utility of consumption is equal across periods (after allowing for tilting due to176
interest rates differing from the household’s rate of time preference).177
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The second first order condition concerning labor supply decision is given by178
Wt
Pt
= Nϕt C
σ
t . (9)
2.2 Firms179
Each firm produces a differentiated good j using a constant returns to scale production180
function:181
Yt(j) = AtNt(j) (10)
where Yt(j) is the output of firm j, and Nt(j) denotes the hours hired by the firm, At is182
an exogenous aggregate productivity shock at period t, and at = log(At) is time varying183
and stochastic.4184
Similar to the household’s problem, we first consider the cost minimization problem185
of firm j, which implies that the real marginal cost of production is given by186
mct =
Wt
PtAt
. (11)
Note that the real marginal cost described in (11) does not depend on the output level187
of an individual firm, since its production function exhibits constant returns to scale and188
prices of inputs (here labor) are fully flexible.189
The demand curve the firm j faces is given by190
Yt(j) =
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt,
where Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt(j)
−1
 dj
) 
−1 .191
The intermediate-good sector is monopolistically competitive and the intermediate192
good producers therefore have certain degrees of market power. In the following, we193
consider two alternative forms of price stickiness - firstly that due to Rotemberg (1982)194
and then that of Calvo (1983).195
2.2.1 Rotemberg Pricing196
The Rotemberg model assumes that a monopolistic firm faces a quadratic cost of adjusting197
nominal prices, which can be measured in terms of the final good and given by198
φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
Yt (12)
4Typically, the logarithm of At is assumed to follow an AR(1) process: at = ρaat−1 + eat, 0 ≤ ρa < 1
where technology shock eat is an i.i.d. random variable, which has a zero mean and a finite standard
deviation σa.
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where φ ≥ 0 measures the degree of nominal price rigidity. The adjustment cost, which199
accounts for the negative effects of price changes on the customer–firm relationship, in-200
creases in magnitude with the size of the price change and with the overall scale of201
economic activity Yt.202
The problem for firm j is then to maximize the discounted value of nominal profits,203
max
{Pt(j)}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+sΞt+s
where nominal profits are defined as204
Ξt = Pt(j)Yt(j)−mctYt(j)Pt − φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt (13)
Firms can change their price in each period, subject to their demand curve and pay-205
ment of the adjustment cost. Hence, all the firms face the same problem, and thus206
will choose the same price, and produce the same quantity such that, Pt(j) = Pt and207
Yt(j) = Yt for any j. Hence, the first-order condition for a symmetric equilibrium is208
(1− ) + mct − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0. (14)
This is the Rotemberg version of the nonlinear Phillips curve that relates current inflation209
to future expected inflation and to the level of output.210
2.2.2 Calvo Pricing211
Each period, the firms that adjust their price are randomly selected, and a fraction 1− θ212
of all firms adjust while the remaining θ fraction do not adjust. Those firms that do213
adjust their price at time t do so to maximize the expected discounted value of current214
and future profits. Profits at some future date t + s are affected by the choice of price215
at time t only if the firm has not received another opportunity to adjust between t and216
t+ s. The probability of this is θs.217
The adjusting firm’s pricing decision problem then involves picking Pt(j) to maximize218
discounted nominal profits. Using the demand curve for the firm’s product, this objective219
function can be written as220
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s
[
Pt(j)
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+s −mct+s
(
Pt(j)
Pt+s
)−
Yt+sPt+s
]
,
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where the discount factor Qt,t+s is given by βs
(
Ct
Ct+s
)σ
Pt
Pt+s
, and mct+s is the marginal221
cost of production.222
Let P ∗t be the optimal price chosen by all firms able to reset their price at time t. The223
first order condition for the optimal choice of P ∗t is,224
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
(15)
where
Kpt = C
−σ
t mctYt + θβEt
[(
Pt+1
Pt
)
Kpt+1
]
F pt = C
−σ
t Yt + θβEt
[(
Pt+1
Pt
)−1
F pt+1
]
.
The price index evolves according to225
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1 with Πt ≡ Pt
Pt−1
. (16)
and price dispersion is described by226
∆t ≡
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
dj = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
∆t−1. (17)
2.3 Aggregate Conditions227
Under Rotemberg pricing, as all the firms will employ the same amount of labor, the228
aggregate production function is simply given by229
Yt = AtNt,
and the aggregate resource constraint is given by230
Yt = Ct +
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2 Yt.
Note that the Rotemberg adjustment cost creates an inefficiency wedge ψRt between out-231
put and consumption232
Ct =
(
1− ψRt
)
Yt =
(
1− ψRt
)
AtNt (18)
where ψRt =
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2.233
In the case of Calvo pricing, firms changing prices in different periods will generally234
have different prices. Thus, the model features price dispersion. When firms have different235
relative prices, there are distortions that create a wedge between the aggregate output236
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measured in terms of production factor inputs and aggregate demand measured in terms237
of the composite goods. Specifically,238
Nt(j) =
Yt(j)
At
=
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
Yt
At
which yields,239
Nt =
∫ 1
0
Nt(j)dj =
Yt
At
∫ 1
0
(
Pt(j)
Pt
)−
dj =
Yt∆t
At
after integrating across firms. ∆t ≥ 1 implies that price dispersion is always costly in240
terms of aggregate output: the higher ∆t, the more labor is needed to produce a given241
level of output. Moreover, under Calvo different firms with different prices will employ242
different amounts of labor. This explains why higher price dispersion acts as a negative243
productivity shift in the aggregate production function: Yt = (At/∆t)Nt. In addition,244
price dispersion is a backward-looking variable which introduces an inertial component245
into the model.246
Under Calvo, the aggregate resource constraint is simply given by247
Yt = Ct.
Hence, after defining ψct = ∆t − 1 as an inefficiency wedge under Calvo, we have248
Ct = Yt =
AtNt
(1 + ψct )
. (19)
Comparing (18) and (19), it is illuminating to note that the Rotemberg adjustment249
cost creates a wedge ψRt between aggregate consumption and aggregate output, while the250
Calvo price dispersion creates a wedge ψct between aggregate hours and aggregate output.251
In addition, both wedges are nonlinear functions of inflation. They are minimized at one252
when steady-state net inflation equals zero (Π = 1), and increase as trend inflation moves253
away from zero. See Ascari and Rossi (2012) for a discussion.254
Appendix C.1 summarizes the models under Rotemberg and Calvo pricing.255
3 Optimal Policy Problem Under Discretion256
In this section, following Woodford (2003) and Anderson et al. (2010), we interpret the257
monetary authority’s problem without commitment as an optimal planning problem, as258
opposed to choosing a particular policy instrument. Under discretion, the monetary au-259
thority solves a sequential or period-by-period optimization problem, which maximizes260
the representative household’s expected discounted utility subject to the optimality con-261
ditions from market participants, the aggregate conditions, and the law of motion for the262
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state variables. Therefore, under optimal discretion, the policymaker cannot commit to263
a plan in the hope of influencing economic agents’ expectations.264
3.1 Rotemberg Pricing265
Let V (At) represents the value function at period t in the Bellman equation for the optimal266
policy problem. The optimal monetary policy then solves the following optimization267
problem:268
V (At) = max{Ct,Yt,Πt}
{
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (At+1)]
}
, (20)
subject to,269
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt, (21)
and,270
(1−)+YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1−φΠt (Πt − 1)+φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0. (22)
Defining an auxiliary function,271
M(At+1) ≡ C−σt+1Yt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1) ,
we can rewrite the Phillips curve (22) as,272
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)] = 0,
which captures the fact that the policy maker recognizes that any change in the state
variable will affect expectations, but cannot promise to behave in a particular way to-
morrow in order to influence expectations today. The optimal policy problem can then
be formulated as the following Lagrangian,
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (At+1)] + λ1t
{[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt − Ct
}
+ λ2t
{
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(At+1)]
}
,
where λ1t and λ2t are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions are given as273
follows:274
consumption,275
C−σt = λ1t − λ2t
{
σYt
ϕCσ−1t At
−ϕ−1 + σφβCσ−1t Y
−1
t Et [M(At+1)]
}
; (23)
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output,276
Yt
ϕAt
−1−ϕ = λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
+ λ2t
{
ϕYt
ϕ−1Cσt At
−ϕ−1 − φβCσt Y −2t Et [M(At+1)]
}
;
(24)
and inflation,277
λ1tφ (Πt − 1)Yt = −λ2tφ (2Πt − 1) . (25)
Note that the consumption Euler equation serves only to define the nominal interest rate.278
The fully nonlinear problem is then to find five policy functions which relate the three279
choice variables {Yt, Ct, Πt} and two Lagrange multipliers {λ1t, λ2t} to the state variable280
At, that is, Yt = Y (At), Ct = C(At), Πt = Π(At), λ1t = λ1(At), and λ2t = λ2(At).281
We will use the Chebyshev collocation method to approximate these five time invariant282
policy rules.283
3.2 Calvo Pricing284
Let V (∆t−1, At) denote the value function at period t in the Bellman equation for the285
optimal policy problem. The optimal monetary policy under discretion then can be286
described as a set of decision rules for {Ct, Nt,Πt, Kpt , F pt ,∆t} which maximize,287
V (∆t−1, At) = max
{
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, At+1)]
}
,
subject to the following constraints:288
NtAt
∆t
= Ct,
Kpt
(1− −1) =
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
F pt ,
F pt = C
1−σ
t + θβEt [L(∆t, At+1)] ,
289
Kpt =
Nϕ+1t
∆t
+ θβEt [M(∆t, At+1)] ,
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) −
1−
+ θΠt∆t−1,
where we have utilized two auxiliary functions,290
M(∆t, At+1) = Π

t+1K
p
t+1,
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and291
L(∆t, At+1) = Π
−1
t+1F
p
t+1,
which again captures the fact that the policy maker recognizes that any change in the292
state variable will affect expectations, but cannot make credible promises about their293
future behavior.294
As before, the policy problem can be written in Lagrangian form as follows:295
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, At+1)] + λ1t
[
NtAt
∆t
− Ct
]
296
+λ2t
[
C1−σt + θβEt [L(∆t, At+1)]− F pt
]
297
+λ3t
[
Nϕ+1t
∆t
+ θβEt [M(∆t, At+1)]−Kpt
]
298
+λ4t
[
(1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) −
1−
+ θΠt∆t−1 −∆t
]
299
+λ5t
[(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
F pt −
Kpt
(1− −1)
]
,
where λjt (j = 1, .., 5) are the Lagrange multipliers. The first order conditions are given300
as follows:301
consumption,302
C−σt − λ1t + (1− σ)C−σt λ2t = 0; (26)
labor,303
−∆tNϕt + Atλ1t + (1 + ϕ)Nϕt λ3t = 0; (27)
inflation,304
− 
((
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
− Πt∆t−1
)
λ4t =
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
1− F pt λ5t
1− θ ; (28)
numerator of optimal price Kpt ,305
λ3t +
λ5t
(1− −1) = 0; (29)
denominator of optimal price F pt ,306
− λ2t +
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
λ5t = 0; (30)
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and price dispersion,
0 = β
∂Et [V (∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
− NtAtλ1t
∆2t
+ θβ
∂Et [L(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
λ2t
+
(
θβ
∂Et [M(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
− N
ϕ+1
t
∆2t
)
λ3t − λ4t.
Note that the envelope theorem yields307
∂V (∆t−1, At)
∂∆t−1
= θΠtλ4t,
which allows us to rewrite the first order condition for price dispersion as,
0 =
Ctλ1t
∆t
+
Nϕt Ct
At∆t
λ3t + λ4t − θβλ2t∂Et [L(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
(31)
− θβλ3t∂Et [M(∆t, At+1)]
∂∆t
− θβEt
[
Πt+1λ4t+1
]
.
We can solve the nonlinear system consisting of these six first order conditions and the308
five constraints to yield the time-consistent optimal policy under Calvo pricing. Specifi-309
cally, without commitment, we need to find these eleven time-invariant policy rules which310
are functions of the two state variables {∆t−1, At}. That is, we need to find policy func-311
tions such as F pt = F p (∆t−1, At), K
p
t = K
p (∆t−1, At), and Πt = Π (∆t−1, At). Similar312
to the Rotemberg case, the Chebyshev collocation method will be used to approximate313
these policy functions.314
4 Numerical Analysis315
This section starts with a description of the global solution method to numerically solve316
for the discretionary equilibrium. Then, the calibration of parameters is discussed.317
4.1 Solution Method318
We use the Chebyshev collocation method with time iteration to globally approximate319
the policy functions.5 In contrast to the linear-quadratic approximation method, this320
projection method can capture the extent to which the two approaches modeling price321
stickiness differ, due to the nonlinearities inherent in the New Keynesian model. First, we322
discretize the state space into a set of collocation nodes. In the Rotemberg model, there is323
one state variable (At), while in the Calvo model there are two state variables (∆t−1, At).324
Accordingly, the space of the approximating functions for the Rotemberg pricing consists325
of one-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials. In comparison, the space of approximating326
5Judd (1992), Judd (1998) and Miranda and Fackler (2004) are good references.
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functions for the Calvo pricing is two-dimensional, and is, given by the tensor products327
of two sets of Chebyshev polynomials. Then we define the residual functions based328
on the equilibrium conditions. Gaussian-Hermite quadrature is used to approximate329
expectation terms. Under Calvo pricing, the partial derivatives with respect to price330
dispersion are approximated by differentiating the Chebyshev polynomials. Finally, we331
solve the resultant system of nonlinear equations consisting of the residual functions332
evaluated at each collocation node.6 See appendix C.2 for details.333
4.2 Calibration334
The benchmark parameters for Calvo pricing are taken from Anderson et al. (2010)335
and are standard. Table 1 summarizes the relevant parameter values. We set β =336
(1/1.04)1/4 = 0.99, which is a standard value for models with quarterly data and implies337
a 4% annual real interest rate. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to338
one (σ = 1) which is in the middle of the parameter range typically considered in the339
literature. Labor supply elasticity is set to ϕ−1 = 1. The elasticity of substitution340
between intermediate goods is chosen as  = 11, which implies a monopolistic markup341
of approximately 10%. The technology parameters are set to ρa = 0.95 and σa = 0.01.342
To make the results from Rotemberg pricing comparable, the value of price adjustment343
cost (φ = 116) is calibrated so that the linear quadratic approximation for both cases are344
equivalent.7 This implies an equivalence between the two forms of pricing provided the345
steady-state is undistorted with a rate of inflation of zero. Admittedly, this commonly346
used strategy is more debatable in the nonlinear context, since it is not guaranteed that347
the equivalence of the two forms of nominal inertia is retained in nonlinear solutions of348
the New Keynesian model where the steady-state is distorted and the rate of inflation349
will typically not be zero. We consider an alternative calibration strategy of matching350
relative inflation/output volatilities in the sensitivity section 5.3 below.351
With this benchmark parameterization, we solve the fully nonlinear models via the352
Chebyshev collocation method. Following Anderson et al. (2010), relative price dispersion353
∆t is bounded by [1, 1.02], and logged productivity at takes values from [−2σa/(1 −354
ρa), 2σa/(1 − ρa)] = [−0.4, 0.4]. For the Rotemberg case, the order of approximation na355
is chosen to be 6, and the number of nodes for Gauss-Hermite quadrature q = 12. This356
combination is quite accurate, since the maximum Euler equation error is of the order of357
10−8. For the Calvo case, the order of approximation na and n∆ are both assigned to be358
6, and q = 12 for Gauss-Hermite quadrature. The maximum Euler equation error over359
6In contrast, Anderson et al. (2010) solve a large system of nonlinear equations consisting of the
residual functions evaluated over all collocation nodes. We use the time iteration method which naturally
divides the large root-finding problem into small problems that can be solved independently. A big
advantage of this method is that parallel computing can be used as the size of system of nonlinear
equations increases.
7That is, φ = (−1)θ(1−θ)(1−βθ) .
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the full range under all the cases is of the order of 10−7. As suggested by Judd (1998),360
this order of accuracy is reasonable.361
5 Results362
This section presents the main results of this paper. First, the inflation bias in the steady363
state between Calvo pricing and Rotemberg pricing is compared. Second, we explain364
why the inflation bias under Calvo can be significantly greater, even though the welfare365
costs of the resulting inflation are substantially greater under Calvo. Finally, sensitivity366
analysis is conducted.367
5.1 Steady State Inflation Bias368
Figure 1 illustrates how the steady-state inflation bias under the two forms of nominal369
rigidities differs as we vary the degree of nominal inertia.8 The black solid line plots the370
annualized inflation bias (in percent) against the Rotemberg adjustment parameter (φ).371
For comparison, the red dashed line plots the inflation bias under Calvo pricing with θ372
ranging from 0.5 to 0.75 - implying average price duration of 2 and 4 quarters, respectively,373
which are reasonable empirical bounds for price adjustment. The mapping between the374
Calvo and Rotemberg parameters, φ for θ, is such that the LQ approximations of the375
two models are equivalent. We can see that the inflation bias problem under Calvo376
pricing (about 2.2%) is more severe than that under Rotemberg pricing (about 1.89%)377
for the benchmark parameters. However, the Calvo pricing does not always imply higher378
inflation bias, as the case with θ = 0.5 shows. More generally, the inflation bias problem379
gradually worsens under Calvo as the degree of nominal inertia is increased, but is largely380
insensitive to the price adjustment cost parameter under Rotemberg, improving very381
slightly as inertia is increased. Conditional on the benchmark values of other calibrated382
parameters, the inflation bias under Calvo rises above that under Rotemberg when the383
probability of price change rises to θ = 0.62 (equivalently φ = 42), an expected duration384
of price contracts of 8 months. This is well within the range of conventional estimates of385
the degree of nominal inertia.386
We now turn to assessing the effect of the monopolistic competition distortion /(−1)387
on the equilibrium inflation bias by changing the value of . We interchangeably describe388
this measure of the monopolistic competition distortion as the flexible-price markup since389
it measures the markup that would be observed under flexible prices. This approach is390
8In general, the steady state here should be called the risky steady state in the sense of Coeurdacier
et al. (2011) since economic agents still anticipate shocks hitting the economy, even if none are actually
realized. When the variance of the productivity shock is set to be effectively zero, the risky steady state
collides with the nonstochastic steady state. In fact, the benchmark productivity shock barely affects
the steady state values. As a double-check, we also shut down the shock and essentially find the same
steady state values.
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based on the fact that the size of the inflation bias depends on the degree of monopolistic391
distortion, which makes steady state (even flexible-price) output inefficient and generates392
the temptation on the part of the policy maker to inflate the economy. Figure 2 shows393
how the size of inflation bias changes as the markup is varied for the Calvo and Rotemberg394
pricing, respectively. The benchmark  = 11 yields a gross flexible-price markup of 1.1.395
When  decreases, the corresponding monopolistic competition distortion and inflation396
bias increases. This has a dramatic impact on the relative size of the inflation bias under397
the two forms of nominal inertia, with the bias under Calvo pricing rising significantly398
above that under Rotemberg.9399
We find that the inflationary bias problem can become significantly greater under400
Calvo as nominal inertia is increased, but especially as the monopolistic competition401
distortion is increased. At the same time Figure 2 shows that consumption falls by402
more, and hours worked by less under Calvo as we increase this distortion, and the403
average markup rises above the flexible price markup under Calvo, while decreasing under404
Rotemberg as a result of the nonlinear effects of the inflation bias. It is also striking that405
the welfare costs of the resulting inflation are substantially greater under Calvo, which406
might have been thought to mitigate the desire to increase inflation in the first place.407
We must, therefore, explain why the high costs of inflation under Calvo do not appear to408
inhibit the inflationary bias problem.409
5.2 Discussion410
In understanding the apparently counterintuitive result that the inflation bias can often be411
significantly higher under Calvo pricing relative to Rotemberg, despite the significantly412
higher welfare costs of inflation under the former, it is helpful to consider the effects413
of inflation on the two models. Ascari and Rossi (2012) discuss how inflation affects414
both models through a ‘wedge’ effect as well as an average markup effect. We shall415
consider the wedge effect first, before turning to the average markup effect, which will416
turn out to be key. Under both forms of nominal inertia the ‘wedge’ implies that the417
representative household’s aggregate consumption will be lower for a given level of labor418
input as inflation rises. Under Calvo, due to price dispersion, the representative household419
consumes relatively more of the cheaper goods to compensate for the expensive goods,420
given diminishing marginal utility in the consumption of each good. As Goodfriend421
and King (1997) and Damjanovic and Nolan (2010a) note, this is akin to a negative422
productivity shock. We can combine the resource and aggregate production function to423
9To illustrate the importance of nonlinearities in this context, the inflation bias for both cases under
the linear-quadratic approximation (LQ) are also presented in Figures 3 and 4 in the online appendix.
The traditional linear-quadratic method becomes increasingly inaccurate for larger distortions.
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yield,424
Ct =
At
(1 + ψct )
Nt,
where the inefficient wedge under Calvo, ψct = ∆t− 1, captures the extent to which price425
dispersion has been raised above one.426
Under Rotemberg the micro-foundation of the wedge is different - adjusting prices427
uses up consumption goods directly. However, we can similarly combine the aggregate428
production function and resource constraint to obtain a similar expression under Rotem-429
berg,430
Ct = At(1− ψRt )Nt,
where the Rotemberg wedge, ψRt =
φ
2
(Πt − 1)2, reflects the costs per unit of output of431
changing prices. Therefore in both cases the labor costs of attaining a particular level of432
aggregate consumption are higher, ceteris paribus, as inflation rises.433
In order to assess how this affects the inflation bias problem facing the policy maker,434
it is helpful to imagine how a social planner would respond to a technology shock in the435
presence of such wedges. Given the form of household utility, the social planner would436
choose an optimal level of labor input of437
Nt
σ+ϕ =
(
At
(1 + ψct )
)1−σ
under Calvo, and438
Nt
σ+ϕ =
(
At(1− ψRt )
)1−σ
under Rotemberg. Therefore, for our benchmark calibration of σ = 1 the social planner439
would not seek to adjust the labor input into the production process as a result of increases440
in either of the wedges, but would simply allow consumption to fall. In other words, for441
our benchmark calibration the efficiencies implied by these wedges do not give the policy442
maker a further desire to generate a surprise inflation, ceteris paribus. While if σ > 1 the443
social planner would seek to reduce the labor input as either of these inefficiency wedges444
increased. That is, in this case the wedges would reduce the desire to encourage firms445
to employ more workers, ceteris paribus. We can see this from Table 2 where raising446
the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, reduces the inflation bias447
under both pricing models. Therefore the different inefficiency wedges under Calvo and448
Rotemberg are not responsible for the observed inflation biases.449
Instead the differences in inflation bias across the two models are generated by their450
average mark-up behavior, which is fundamentally different. Consider the steady-state of451
the average markup (equal to the inverse of real marginal cost) under Rotemberg which452
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is obtained by rearranging the deterministic steady state of the NKPC as,453
mc−1 =
[
− 1

+
(1− β)

φ(Π− 1)Π
]−1
.
The second term within the square brackets exists as a combination of steady-state in-454
flation and discounting on the part of firms (on behalf of their owners, the representative455
household). Essentially as the firms discount future profits they also discount future price456
adjustment costs. As a result, in the face of ongoing inflation, they will opt to partially457
delay the required price adjustment such that the average markup is decreasing in infla-458
tion. This effect, whereby the average markup under Rotemberg is falling in inflation, is459
enhanced as the degree of nominal inertia and/or flexible-price markup increase.460
The effect of inflation on the average markup under Calvo is,461
mc−1 =

− 1
(
1− θβΠ−1
1− θβΠ
)(
1− θΠ−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
.
In this case the effects of inflation on the average markup are ambiguous. However,462
following King and Wolman (1996) the average markup can be decomposed into two463
elements - the marginal markup,464
P ∗
MC
=

− 1
(
1− θβΠ−1
1− θβΠ
)
,
and the price adjustment gap,465
P
P ∗
=
(
1− θΠ−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
.
Here we can see that higher inflation raises the marginal markup. Firms facing the466
possibility of being stuck with the current price for a prolonged period will tend to raise467
their reset price when that price is likely to be eroded by inflation throughout the life468
of that contract. The effect of inflation on the price-adjustment gap will tend to reduce469
this element of the average markup. However, except at very low rates of inflation, the470
effect of inflation on the average markup through the marginal markup channel is positive.471
Additionally, in contrast to what we find under Rotemberg, greater price stickiness and/or472
a flexible price markup further increase the average markup under Calvo.473
Therefore, we would expect to see average markups rise with inflation under Calvo,474
but fall under Rotemberg, especially as price stickiness and/or the flexible-price markup475
are increased. This, in turn, implies that the inflationary bias problem is worsened under476
Calvo as the rising markups increase the policy makers incentives to introduce a surprise477
inflation, ceteris paribus, at the same time as it is mitigated under Rotemberg. As a478
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result, the inflation bias problem can become significantly higher under Calvo where479
consumption falls by more and hours by less than it does under Rotemberg, despite the480
fact that a given level of inflation is typically found to be more costly in welfare terms481
under Calvo.482
Finally, we do some comparative statics with the model under both pricing approaches,483
in order to explore how other parameters affect the severity of the inflation bias problem484
and the sensitivity of the results obtained from the linear-quadratic approach. Table 2485
summarizes the robustness outcomes for the Calvo and Rotemberg pricing. Notably, there486
are cases where the inflation bias problem is much worse under Calvo pricing, especially487
as the endogenous markup effect is enhanced by raising the flexible-price markup and/or488
the degree of price stickiness.489
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis490
Table 2 considers the robustness of our results across various parameters for Calvo and491
Rotemberg pricing. The first three rows of the table increase the degree of nominal inertia492
(where the Rotemberg price adjustment parameter is adjusted in line with the changes493
in the Calvo parameter such that the linearized NKPC is equivalent across both forms of494
nominal inertia). As we increase the degree of nominal inertia, we find that the inflation495
bias rises under Calvo, but falls under Rotemberg. Figure 1 illustrates this point as well.496
This is for the reasons discussed above. Under Calvo greater price stickiness means that497
firms are likely to be stuck with their current prices for longer, such that they aggressively498
raise prices when given the opportunity to do so. This will tend to raise average markups499
and worsen the inflationary bias problem.10 In contrast, under Rotemberg higher price500
adjustment costs result in firms wishing to delay price adjustment which reduces average501
markups and reduces the inflation bias problem.502
The next piece of sensitivity analysis looks at various parameterizations of the inverse503
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ. As noted above, at the benchmark504
value of σ = 1, the social planner would not wish to expand employment as either of505
the efficiency wedges due to the two forms of nominal inertia increase. While if σ < (>)506
1 then they would wish to increase (decrease) the labor input as either efficient wedge507
increased. Therefore we see the inflationary bias falling as σ increases across both forms508
of nominal inertia. Finally, we consider an increase in the inverse of the Frisch elasticity509
of labor supply, ϕ, which serves to reduce the inflationary bias problem across both types510
of price stickiness. As labor supply becomes less elastic, there is less desire to use costly511
inflation surprises to achieve only marginal increases in the level of output and therefore512
the inflation bias falls.513
10It is only at extremely high levels of price stickiness (θ = 0.9, or an average price contract duration of
two and a half years) that the steady state rate of inflation begins to fall as the costs of price dispersion
begin to overturn the average markup effect.
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Alternative Calibration Strategy514
In conducting the analysis above, we followed the standard approach in the literature515
of calibrating the Rotemberg price adjustment parameter to ensure the linearized NKPC516
isomorphic across both descriptions of nominal inertia. However, it is not obvious that517
this approach is valid given our model features several key nonlinearities. We therefore518
follow an alternative strategy of choosing the Rotemberg price adjustment cost parameter519
to ensure the relative volatilities of output and inflation are the same across the two520
models.11 To do so, we move away from the technology shock considered in Anderson521
et al. (2010) and introduce a cost-push shock, since the technology shock does not generate522
a plausible degree of inflation volatility.12 We adopt the estimated shock process from523
Chen et al. (2014) which is modeled as a revenue tax rate fluctuating around a steady524
state value of zero,525
ln (1− τpt) = (1− ρτp) ln (1− τp) + ρτp ln (1− τpt−1)− eτt
where eτt ∼ N(0, 0.004862) and ρτp = 0.939. In a log-linearized model this is equivalent526
to allow for fluctuations in the desired markup through variations in . However, in our527
nonlinear model allowing  to be time varying has a direct impact on the measure of528
price dispersion in a way which would not normally be considered to be an inherent part529
of a cost-push shock. Therefore we focus on variations in a revenue tax as a means of530
generating an autocorrelated cost-push shock which is consistent with the data. The531
complete model with this time-varying revenue tax rate is presented in appendix C.4.532
Under the calibration strategy for Calvo parameters of 0.613, 0.615 and 0.617, the533
corresponding Rotemberg adjustment costs parameters are 50, 116 and 250. These are534
increasingly above the conventionally calibrated Rotemberg parameters of around 40, 41535
and 41. Since increasing price-stickiness reduces average markups under Rotemberg, this536
reduces the associated inflation bias to 1.92%, 1.88% and 1.86%, respectively, while im-537
plying a relative worsening of the inflation bias under Calvo to 1.93% across all variants.538
In this sense, the possible inapplicability of the standard calibration strategy does not539
seem to be responsible for our results - if anything it leads them to be under-reported.540
However, it is also important to stress that the impact of changing the Rotemberg ad-541
justment cost function has only a limited impact on the resultant inflation bias, such that542
regardless of the calibration strategy it is relatively easy to find cases where the inflation543
bias rises significantly under Calvo relative to Rotemberg through the endogenous markup544
effects highlighted in the paper. It is not possible to apply this alternative calibration545
11We thank the associate editor Andre Kurmann for suggesting this alternative approach.
12The technology shock already present in our model does not create meaningful policy trade-offs
under our benchmark calibration since the policy maker will apply offsetting interest rate movements
regardless of the form of nominal inertia. Hence, we shut down the technology shock in this section and
focus on the effects of the cost-push shock.
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strategy outside of this range as for higher or lower values of the Calvo parameter, there546
is no Rotemberg cost adjustment parameter that can deliver the same relative volatilities547
of output and inflation. We therefore follow the conventional approach throughout the548
rest of the paper.549
6 Conclusion550
In this paper we have contrasted the properties of the Calvo and Rotemberg forms of nom-551
inal inertia which are commonly used in New Keynesian analyses of macroeconomic policy.552
They are often treated as being interchangeable, largely because they generate equivalent553
NKPCs and policy implications when linearized around an efficient zero-inflation steady554
state. However, our nonlinear solution of the discretionary policy problem reveals some555
striking differences across the two models of price stickiness, which have significant im-556
plications for the importance of nonlinearities in New Keynesian policy analyses more557
generally.558
The inflation bias problem is often far greater under Calvo pricing than Rotemberg559
pricing, despite the fact that the costs of inflation are significantly higher under the560
former. The reason for this is that inflation raises the average markup under Calvo561
pricing as firms seek to raise their prices more aggressively whenever they can to avoid562
the erosion of their relative price due to inflation. This increase in average markups563
worsens the inflationary bias problem. In contrast, under Rotemberg pricing firms can564
adjust prices every period, and will moderate their average markups as inflation rises565
as they attempt to delay some of the costs of price adjustment due to the discounting566
inherent in their objective function. These endogenous markup effects, which move in567
opposite directions across Rotemberg and Calvo pricing, are enhanced as the flexible-price568
markup and/or the degree of nominal inertia are increased.569
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A Tables642
Table 1: Parameterization
Parameter Value Definition
β 0.99 Quarterly discount factor
σ 1 Relative risk aversion coefficient
ϕ 1 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
 11 Elasticity of substitution between varieties
θ 0.75 Probability of fixing prices in each quarter
ρa 0.95 AR-coefficient of technology shock
σa 0.01 Standard deviation of technology shock
φ 116 Rotemberg adjustment cost
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis
Parameter Values Nonlinear solution LQ solution
θ σ ϕ  Calvo Rotemberg Calvo Rotemberg
θ 0.5 1 1 11 1.84 1.93 1.66 1.83
0.75 1 1 11 2.18 1.90 1.65 1.82
0.85 1 1 11 3.01 1.83 1.64 1.80
σ 0.75 0.3 1 11 5.64 2.95 2.54 2.54
0.75 1 1 11 2.18 1.90 1.65 1.82
0.75 5 1 11 0.60 0.64 0.56 0.56
ϕ 0.75 1 0.36 11 4.31 2.83 2.42 2.42
0.75 1 1 11 2.18 1.90 1.65 1.82
0.75 1 4.75 11 0.60 0.64 0.56 0.56
Note: the nonlinear solution and LQ solution contain the annualized inflation rate in percentage solved
by the projection method and the LQ method, respectively. The numbers are rounded up.
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Figure 1: This figure plots annualized inflation bias (in percent) against the Rotemberg adjustment parameter (φ). For
Calvo, the inflation bias is calculated with respect to θ ranging from 0.5 to 0.75. The corresponding values of φ are
determined such that the LQ approximations of the two models are equivalent.
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Figure 2: This figure contrasts the effect of monopolistic distortion under Calvo pricing and Rotemberg pricing. The
monopolistic distortion is measured by markup at the deterministic steady state with zero inflation rate.
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C Technical Appendix (Not for Publication)
C.1 Summary of Models
C.1.1 Rotemberg Pricing
The equilibrium conditions are given as follows:
Consumption Euler equation:
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1
Labor supply: (
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t
Resource constraint: [
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt = Ct
Phillips curve:
(1− ) + mct − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0
Technology:
Yt = AtNt
Marginal costs:
mct =
Wt
PtAt
=
Nϕt C
σ
t
At
=
(Yt/At)
ϕCσt
At
= Yt
ϕCσt At
−ϕ−1
We can simplify these equilibrium conditions by eliminating the interest rate and
labour supply from the constraints, so that consumption can be considered as the mone-
tary policy instrument. Specifically,
Resource constraint: [
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt = Ct
Phillips curve:
(1− ) + YtϕCσt At−ϕ−1 − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβEt
[(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ
Yt+1
Yt
Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
]
= 0
while the objective function is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
Note that the state variables are productivity (and any other exogenous shock pro-
cesses we choose to add).
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C.1.2 Calvo Pricing
The equilibrium conditions are given below:
Consumption Euler equation:
βRtEt
{(
Ct
Ct+1
)σ (
Pt
Pt+1
)}
= 1
Labor supply: (
Wt
Pt
)
= Nϕt C
σ
t
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct =
AtNt
∆t
Phillips curve:
P ∗t
Pt
=
(

− 1
)
Kpt
F pt
Inflation:
1 = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)1−
+ θ(Πt)
−1
Price dispersion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ
(
Pt
Pt−1
)
∆t−1
= (1− θ)
(
P ∗t
Pt
)−
+ θ (Πt)
 ∆t−1
Marginal costs:
mct =
Wt
PtAt
=
Nϕt C
σ
t
At
= (Yt∆t)
ϕCσt At
−ϕ−1
Note that the state variables are not just productivity, but also price dispersion.
C.2 Numerical Algorithm
C.2.1 Algorithm for Rotemberg Pricing
In the following, let st denote the state of the economy at time t. There are five functional
equations associated with five endogenous variables {Ct, Yt,Πt, λ1t, λ2t}.
The state is st = at ≡ lnAt, which evolves according to the following motion equation:
at+1 = ρaat + eat
where 0 ≤ ρa < 1 and technology innovation eat is an i.i.d. normal random variable,
which has a zero mean and a finite standard deviation σa.
Let’s define a new function X : R → R5, in order to collect the policy functions of
endogenous variables as follows:
X(st) = (Ct(st), Yt(st),Πt(st), λ1t(st), λ2t(st))
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Given the specification of the function X, the equilibrium conditions can be written more
compactly as,
Γ(st, X(st), Et [Z (X(st+1))]) = 0
where Γ : R1+5+1 → R5 summarizes the full set of dynamic equilibrium relationship, and
Z (X(st+1)) = M(At+1). Then the problem is to find a vector-valued function X that Γ
maps to the zero function. Projection methods, hence, can be used.
Following the notation convention in the literature, we simply use s = (a) to denote the
current state of the economy st = (at), and s′ to represent next period state that evolves
according to the law of motion specified above. The Chebyshev collocation method with
time iteration which we use to solve this nonlinear system can be described as follows:
1. Define the collocation nodes and the space of the approximating functions:
• Choose an order of approximation (i.e., the polynomial degrees) na for the
state space s = (a), then there are Ns = (na + 1) nodes in the state space. Let
S = (S1, S2, ..., SNs) denote the set of collocation nodes.
• Compute the na + 1 roots of the Chebychev polynomial of order na + 1 as
zia = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(na + 1)
)
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1.
• Compute collocation points
ai =
a+ a
2
+
a− a
2
zia =
a− a
2
(
zia + 1
)
+ a
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, which map [−1, 1] into [a, a]. Note that the collocation
nodes is given by
S = {ai | i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1}
• Formulate the approximating policy functions. Let Ti(z) = cos(i cos−1(z)) de-
note the Chebyshev polynomial of order i, z ∈ [−1, 1], and let ξ denote a linear
function mapping the domain of x ∈ [x, x] into [−1, 1]. In this way, Ti(ξ(x))
are Chebyshev polynomials adapted to x ∈ [x, x] for i = 0, 1, .... Apparently,
ξ(x) = 2 (x− x) / (x− x)−1. Then, the space of the approximating functions,
denoted as Ω, is a matrix of one-dimensional Chebyshev polynomials given by
Ω (S) =

Ω (S1)
Ω (S2)
...
Ω (SNs)
 =

1 T1(ξ (a1)) T2(ξ (a1)) · · · Tna(ξ (a1))
1 T1(ξ (a2)) T2(ξ (a2)) · · · Tna(ξ (a2))
...
...
... · · · ...
1 T1(ξ (ana+1)) T2(ξ (ana+1)) · · · Tna(ξ (ana+1))

Ns×Ns
.
• Then, at each node s ∈ S, policy functions X(s) are approximated by X(s) =
Ω(s)ΘX ,
where
ΘX = [θy, θc, θpi, θλ1 , θλ2 ]
is a Ns × 5 matrix of the approximating coefficients.
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2. Formulate an initial guess for the approximating coefficients, Θ0X , and specify the
stopping rule tol, say, 10−6.
3. At each iteration j, we can get an updated ΘjX by implement the following time
iteration step:
• At each collocation node s ∈ S, compute the possible values of future policy
functions X(s′) for k = 1, ..., q. That is,
X(s′) = Ω(s′)Θj−1X
where q is the number of Gauss-Hermite quadrature nodes. Note that
Ω(s′) = Tja (ξ(a
′))
is a q ×Ns matrix, with a′ = ρaa+ zk
√
2σ2a, ja = 0, ..., na.
• Now calculate the expectation terms E [Z (X(s′))] at each node s. Let ωk
denote the weights for the quadrature, then
E [M(s′)] ≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Ĉ(s′; θc)
)−σ
Ŷ (s′; θy)Π̂(s′; θpi)
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)− 1
)
≡ Ψ (s′, q)
The hat symbol indicates the corresponding approximate policy functions, so
Ĉ is the approximate policy for consumption, for example.
• At each collocation node s, solve for X(s) such that
Γ
(
s,X(s), E
[
Ẑ (X(s′))
])
= 0
The Matlab equation solver csolve.m written by Christopher A. Sims is em-
ployed to solve the resulted system of nonlinear equations. With X(s) at hand,
we can get the corresponding coefficient
Θ̂jX =
(
Ω (S)T Ω (S)
)−1
Ω (S)T X(s)
• Update the approximating coefficients, ΘjX = ηΘ̂jX + (1− η) Θj−1X , where 0 ≤
η ≤ 1 is some dampening parameter used for improving convergence.
4. Check the stopping rules. If
∥∥ΘjX −Θj−1X ∥∥ < tol, then stop, else update the ap-
proximation coefficients and go back to step 3.
When implementing the above algorithm, we start from lower order Chebyshev poly-
nomials and some reasonable initial guess. Then, we increase the order of approximation
and take as starting value the solution from the previous lower order approximation. This
informal homotopy continuation idea ensures us to find a solution.
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C.2.2 Algorithm for Calvo Pricing
Now the state space is st = (∆t−1, At), where price dispersion ∆t−1 is endogenous and
technology At is exogenous and respectively, with the following law of motion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) −
1−
+ θΠt∆t−1
at = ρaat−1 + eat
There are 6 endogenous variables and 5 Lagrangian multipliers, hence 11 functional e-
quations. Similar to Rotemberg pricing, we can rewrite this nonlinear system a more
compact form,
Γ (st, X(st), Et [Z (X(st+1))] , Et [Z∆ (X(st+1))]) = 0
where Γ : R2+11+3+3 → R11 summarizing the equilibrium relationship,
X(st) = (Ct(st), Nt(st),Πt(st),K
p
t (st), F
p
t (st),∆t(st), λ1t(st), λ2t(st), λ3t(st), λ4t(st), λ5t(st))
collecting the policy functions we need to solve, with X : R2 → R11, and
Z (X(st+1)) =
 Z1 (X(st+1))Z2 (X(st+1))
Z3 (X(st+1))
 =
 M(∆t, at+1)L(∆t, at+1)
(Πt+1)
 λ4t+1

and
Z∆ (X(st+1)) =

∂Z1(X(st+1))
∂∆t
∂Z2(X(st+1))
∂∆t
∂Z3(X(st+1))
∂∆t
 =

∂M(∆t,at+1)
∂∆t
∂L(∆t,at+1)
∂∆t
∂[(Πt+1)
λ4t+1]
∂∆t

=
  (Πt+1)
−1Kpt+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂K
p
t+1
∂∆t
(− 1) (Πt+1)−2 F pt+1 ∂Πt+1∂∆t + (Πt+1)
−1 ∂F pt+1
∂∆t
 (Πt+1)
−1 λ4t+1
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
+ (Πt+1)
 ∂λ4t+1
∂∆t

Note we are assuming Et [Z∆ (X(st+1))] = ∂Et [Z (X(st+1))] /∆t, which is normally valid
using the Interchange of Integration and Differentiation Theorem.
Again, let s = (∆, a) to denote the current state of the economy st = (∆t−1, at), and
s′ to represent next period state that evolves according to the law of motion specified
above. The Chebyshev collocation method with time iteration for solving the nonlinear
system can be described as follows:
1. Define the collocation nodes and the space of the approximating functions:
• Choose an order of approximation n∆ and na for each dimension of the state
space s = (∆, a), then there are Ns = (n∆ + 1) × (na + 1) nodes in the state
space. Let S = (S1, S2, ..., SNs) denote the set of collocation nodes.
• Compute the n∆ + 1 and na + 1 roots of the Chebychev polynomial of order
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n∆ + 1 and na + 1 as
zi∆ = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(n∆ + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1.
zia = cos
(
(2i− 1)pi
2(na + 1)
)
, for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1.
• Compute collocation points ai as
ai =
a+ a
2
+
a− a
2
zia =
a− a
2
(
zia + 1
)
+ a
for i = 1, 2, ..., na + 1, which map [−1, 1] into [a, a]. Similarly, compute collo-
cation points ∆i as
∆i =
∆ + ∆
2
+
∆−∆
2
zi∆ =
∆−∆
2
(
zi∆ + 1
)
+ ∆
for i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1, which map [−1, 1] into [∆,∆]. Note that
S = {(∆i, aj) | i = 1, 2, ..., n∆ + 1, j = 1, 2, ..., na + 1}
that is, the tensor grids, with S1 = (∆1, a1), S2 = (∆1, a2), ..., SNs =
(∆n∆+1, ana+1).
• The space of the approximating functions, denoted as Ω, is a matrix of two-
dimensional Chebyshev polynomials. More specifically,
Ω (S) =

Ω (S1)
Ω (S2)
...
Ω (Sna+1)
...
Ω (SNs )

=

1 T0(ξ(∆1)T1(ξ (a1)) T0(ξ(∆1)T2(ξ (a1)) · · · Tnb (ξ(∆1)Tna (ξ (a1))
1 T0(ξ(∆1)T1(ξ (a2)) T0(ξ(∆1)T2(ξ (a2)) · · · Tnb (ξ(∆1)Tna (ξ (a2))
...
...
... · · ·
...
1 T0(ξ(∆1)T1(ξ (ana+1)) T0(ξ(∆1)T2(ξ (ana+1)) · · · T0(ξ(∆1)Tna (ξ (ana+1))
...
...
... · · ·
...
1 T0(ξ(∆n∆+1)T1(ξ (ana+1)) T0(ξ(∆n∆+1)T2(ξ (ana+1)) · · · T0(ξ(∆n∆+1)Tna (ξ (ana+1))

Ns×Ns
where ξ(x) = 2 (x− x) / (x− x)−1 maps the domain of x ∈ [x, x] into [−1, 1].
• Then, at each node s ∈ S, policy functions X(s) are approximated by X(s) =
Ω(s)ΘX ,
where
ΘX = [θc, θn, θpi, θk, θf , θ∆, θλ1 , θλ2 , θλ3 , θλ4 , θλ5 ]
is a Ns × 13 matrix of the collocation coefficients.
2. Formulate an initial guess for the approximating coefficients, Θ0X , and specify the
stopping rule tol, say, 10−6.
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3. At each iteration j, we can get an updated ΘjX by implement the following time
iteration step:
• At each collocation node s ∈ S, compute the possible values of future policy
functions X(s′) for k = 1, ..., q. That is,
X(s′) = Ω(s′)Θj−1X
where q is the number of Gauss-Hermite quadrature nodes. Note that
Ω(s′) = Tj∆(ξ(∆
′))Tja (ξ(a
′))
is a q×Ns matrix, with ∆′ = ∆̂(s; θ∆), a′ = ρaa+zk
√
2σ2a, j∆ = 0, ..., n∆, and
ja = 0, ..., na. The hat symbol indicates the corresponding approximate policy
functions, so ∆̂ is the approximate policy for price dispersion, for example.
Similarly, the two auxiliary functions can be calculated as follows:
M(s′) ≈
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)
K̂(s′; θk)
and,
L(s′) ≈
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1
F̂ (s′; θf ).
• Now calculate the expectation terms E [Z (X(s′))] at each node s. Let ωk
denote the weights for the quadrature, then
E [M(s′)] ≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)
K̂(s′; θk) ≡M (s′, q)
E [L(s′)] ≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1
F̂ (s′; θf ) ≡ L (s′, q)
and
Et [(Πt+1)
 λ6t+1] ≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1
λ̂4(s
′; θλ6) ≡ Λ (s′, q) .
Hence,
E [Z (X(s′))] ≈ E
[
Ẑ (X(s′))
]
=
 Ψ (s′, q)L (s′, q)
Λ (s′, q)

• Next calculate the partial derivatives under expectation E [Z∆ (X(s′))]. Note
that we only need to compute ∂Πt+1/∂∆t, ∂Kpt+1/∂∆t and ∂F
p
t+1/∂∆t, which
are given as follows:
∂Πt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θpi,j∆ja
∆−∆ T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆i))Tja (ξ(aj)) ≡ Π̂∆ (s′)
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∂Kpt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θk,j∆ja
∆−∆ T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆t))Tja (ξ(at+1)) ≡ K̂∆ (s′)
∂F pt+1
∂∆t
≈
n∆∑
j∆=0
na∑
ja=0
2θf,j∆ja
∆−∆ T
′
j∆
(ξ(∆t))Tja (ξ(at+1)) ≡ F̂∆ (s′)
Hence, we can approximate the two partial derivatives under expectation
∂E [M(s′)]
∂∆
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
[

(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1
K̂(s′; θk)Π̂∆ (s′) +
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)
K̂∆ (s
′)
]
≡ M̂∆ (s′, q) ,
∂E [L(s′)]
∂∆
≈ 1√
pi
q∑
k=1
ωk
[
(− 1)
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−2
F̂ (s′; θf )Π̂∆ (s′) +
(
Π̂(s′; θpi)
)−1
F̂∆ (s
′)
]
≡ L̂∆ (s′, q) .
That is,
E [Z∆ (X(s
′))] ≈ E
[
Ẑ∆ (X(s
′))
]
=
[
M̂∆ (s
′, q)
L̂∆ (s
′, q)
]
• At each collocation node s, solve for X(s) such that
Γ
(
s,X(s), E
[
Ẑ (X(s′))
]
, E
[
Ẑ∆ (X(s
′))
])
= 0
The Matlab equation solver csolve.m written by Christopher A. Sims is em-
ployed to solve the resulted system of nonlinear equations. With X(s) at hand,
we can get the corresponding coefficient
Θ̂jX =
(
Ω (S)T Ω (S)
)−1
Ω (S)T X(s)
• Update the approximating coefficients, ΘjX = ηΘ̂jX + (1− η) Θj−1X , where 0 ≤
η ≤ 1 is some dampening parameter used for improving convergence.
4. Check the stopping rules. If
∥∥ΘjX −Θj−1X ∥∥ < tol, then stop, else update the ap-
proximation coefficients and go back to step 3.
When implementing the above algorithm, we start from lower order Chebyshev poly-
nomials and some reasonable initial guess. Then, we increase the order of approximation
and take as starting value the solution from the previous lower order approximation. This
informal homotopy continuation idea ensures us to find a solution.
C.3 Welfare Comparison
In order to compare the social welfare under Calvo and Rotemberg pricing in a fully
nonlinear model, we first describe the second-order approximation to welfare. Then
we transform the welfare as the fraction of the consumption path under the Ramsey
allocation that must be given up in order to equalize welfare under the Ramsey policy
and discretionary policy.
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C.3.1 The Quadratic Approximation to Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
Ut ≡ U(Ct, Nt) = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
N1+ϕt
1 + ϕ
Let X̂t ≡ log
(
Xt/X
)
denote the log-deviation of variable Xt from its steady state X. In
addition, let X˜t = Xt−X denote the linear deviation of Xt around its steady state value.
Then using a second-order Taylor approximation,
Xt −X
X
=
X˜t
X
= X̂t +
1
2
X̂2t + o(2) (32)
where o(2) represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the bound on the amplitude
of the relevant shocks. We will repeatedly use (32) to derive a second-order approximation
to the social welfare.
Now consider the second-order approximation to per period utility,
Ut = U + C
1−σ
[
Ĉt +
1− σ
2
Ĉ2t
]
−N1+ϕ
[
N̂t +
1 + ϕ
2
N̂2t
]
+ o(2)
where
U =
C
1−σ − 1
1− σ −
N
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
Rotemberg Pricing The second-order approximation to market clearing condition,
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Yt, is
Ĉt +
1
2
Ĉ2t = Ŷt +
1
2
Ŷ 2t −
φ
2
Π̂2t + o(2)
such that,
Ut = U − (σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2
[
(xt − x∗)2 + φ
ϕ+ σ
Π̂2t
]
+ C
1−σ
 Φ22(ϕ+σ) − (1−σ)(1−Φ)−(1+ϕ)1+ϕ Ŷ ft
+ (1−σ)(σ+ϕ)
2(1+ϕ)
(
Ŷ ft
)2
+ o(2) (33)
where Ŷ ft = log
(
Y ft /Y
f
)
denote the log-deviation of output from its steady state under
flexible price, xt ≡ Ŷt−Ŷ ft is the output gap, x∗ ≡ lnY −lnY f = − ln (1− Φ) / (σ + ϕ) ≈
Φ/ (σ + ϕ) is a measure of the distortion created by the presence of monopolistic compe-
tition alone, t.i.p. are terms independent of policy, and terms like Φ
(
Ŷ ft
)2
and ΦŶtŶ ft
are omitted13. In addition, the fact that N1+ϕ = (1− −1)C1−σ ≡ (1− Φ)C1−σ, and
Ât = (ϕ+ σ) / (1 + ϕ) Ŷ
f
t is used in deriving (33).
Hence,
13When Φ = 1/ is so small that the product of Φ with a second-order term can be ignored as negligible.
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WR ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βtUt =
U
1− β −
(σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(xt − x∗)2 + φ
σ + ϕ
Π̂2t
]
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)
]
+ o(2)
=
U
1− β − ΩRE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λR (xt − x∗)2 + Π̂2t
]
(34)
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)
]
+ o(2)
where
ΩR ≡ φC
1−σ
2
λR ≡ σ + ϕ
φ
Note that we derive the LQ welfare function explicitly retaining the relevant t.i.p in order
to make a legitimate comparison with the social welfare obtained from the fully nonlinear
model.
In order to calculate the inflation bias under LQ method, we write down the log-
linearized IS equation and NKPC below. The IS curve is,
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1
)
+
1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
and the NKPC is,
Π̂t = βEtΠ̂t+1 +
(− 1) (ϕ+ σ)
φ
xt
Calvo Pricing The second-order approximation to market clearing condition is
Ĉt +
1
2
Ĉ2t = Ŷt +
1
2
Ŷ 2t + o(2)
and it can be shown (see Woodford, 2003, chap 6) that,
N̂t =
(
Ŷt − Ât
)
+

2
varj
(
P̂t(j)
)
+ o(2)
Hence, similar to the Rotemberg case,
Ut = U − (ϕ+ σ)C
1−σ
2
[
(xt − x∗)2 + 
ϕ+ σ
varj
(
P̂t(j)
)]
+C
1−σ
[
Φ2
2 (ϕ+ σ)
− (1− σ) (1− Φ)− (1 + ϕ)
(1 + ϕ)
Ŷ ft +
(1− σ) (σ + ϕ)
2 (1 + ϕ)
(
Ŷ ft
)2]
+ o(2)
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The next step is to relate price dispersion ∆t ≡ varj
(
P̂t(j)
)
to the average inflation rate
across all firms. Walsh (2003, p.554) shows that
∆t ≈ θ∆t−1 +
(
θ
1− θ
)
pi2t
which implies
∞∑
t=0
βt∆t =
θ
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
∞∑
t=0
βtpi
2
t
Therefore,
WC =
U
1− β − ΩCE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λC (xt − x∗)2 + pi2t
]
+
[
Φ2C
1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) −
(1− σ) (1 + ϕ)C1−σσ2a
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β) (1− ρa)\
]
+ o(2)
where
ΩC ≡ (σ + ϕ)C
1−σ
2

κ
λC ≡ κ/
κ ≡ (1− θ) (1− θβ) (σ + ϕ)
θ
The log-linearized IS equation and NKPC are given, respectively, as follows:
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1
)
+
1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
Π̂t = βEtΠ̂t+1 + κxt
Note that when
φ =
(− 1) θ
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
the NKPC under both Rotemberg pricing and Calvo pricing are the same. Also note
that λR =
(

−1
)
λC , and ΩR =
(
−1

)
ΩC . The inflation weights λR and λC differ only
marginally, since  usually takes values between 7 and 10 in the applied literature.
C.3.2 Inflation Bias Under LQ Method
We can rewrite the above LQ model as follows, using pit = Πt− 1 ≈ ln (Πt)− ln
(
Π
)
= Π̂t
and it = Rt − 1 ≈ ln (Rt)− ln
(
R
)
= R̂t:
max
{xt,pit}
−ΩjE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
λj (xt − x∗)2 + pi2t
]
subject to
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt (35)
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
σ
(it − Etpit+1) + 1 + ϕ
ϕ+ σ
(ρa − 1) Ât
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where j = R,C. Woodford (2003, p.471) shows that the equilibrium inflation under
optimal discretion is
pit =
λj
λj + κ2
(βEtpit+1 + κx
∗)
hence the steady state pi under rational expectation satisfies
pi =
λj
λj + κ2
(βpi + κx∗)
that is,
pi =
λjκ
(1− β)λj + κ2x
∗ =
λjκ
(1− β)λj + κ2
Φ
(σ + ϕ)
with j = R,C. pi is the so-called inflation bias, relative to the targeted zero rate of
inflation which is optimal under perfect commitment.
Note that λR ≥ λC and
dpi
dλj
=
Φ
σ + ϕ
κ3
[(1− β)λj + κ2]2
> 0
which imply that piR ≥ piC . That is, the inflation bias problem using the LQ approxima-
tion is always worsen under the Rotemberg pricing than that under the Calvo pricing.
C.3.3 Relative Welfare Cost
The welfare under discretion from the LQ method is calculated as follows. Unless stated
otherwise, the superscript d denotes the discretion case, and subscripts R and C represent
the Rotemberg and Calvo pricing, respectively. From (35), x = (1− β) pi/κ, then using
the log-linearized model we can solve for steady state values for deviations Ĉt and N̂t,
denoted as Ĉ and N̂ , respectively. It is straightforward to show that Ĉ = N̂ = Ŷ = x.
Finally, the steady state values for levels Ct and Nt, are
C
d
j = C
r
eĈ ≈ Cr
(
1 + Ĉ
)
= C
r
(1 + x)
N
d
j = N
r
eN̂ ≈ N r
(
1 + N̂
)
= N
r
(1 + x)
where j = R,C, and
C
r
= N
r
=
(
− 1

)1/(σ+ϕ)
are the Ramsey steady states around which we log-linearize the model. Therefore,
Wj =
1
1− β

(
C
d
j
)1−σ
− 1
1− σ −
(
N
d
j
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
− Ωj
1− β
[
λj
(
(1− β) pi
κ
− Φ
(ϕ+ σ)
)2
+ pi2
]
+
(
C
d
j
)1−σ
2 (ϕ+ σ) (1− β)
[
Φ2 − (1− σ) (1 + ϕ)σ
2
a
(1− ρa)
]
where j = R,C.
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For the fully nonlinear method, the welfare under discretion is calculated by adding
corresponding policy functions into optimal policy problem and then approximated by
the Chebyshev collocation method. That is,
W dR,t = W
d
R (At) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(Yt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
[
W dR(At+1)
]
W dC,t = W
d
C (∆t−1, At) =
C1−σt − 1
1− σ −
(∆tYt/At)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt
[
W dC(∆t, At+1)
]
and the steady state welfare, denoted as W dR and W dC for ease of notation, can be corre-
spondingly found.
Note that WR, W dR and WC , W dC which represent the conditional expectation of life-
time utility, are absolute welfare measures under Rotemberg pricing and Calvo pricing,
respectively. However, the utility function is ordinal, so a welfare measure based on the
value function is not very revealing. Hence, we calculate the relative welfare cost in terms
of the consumption equivalent units under the Ramsey allocation. Specifically, we want
to find ξ such that
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Cdt , N
d
t ) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU((1− ξ)Crt , N rt )
where the r superscript denotes the Ramsey allocation (under full commitment), and
the d superscript stands for the allocation under discretion. Given the utility function
adopted, the expression for ξ in percentage terms is
ξ =
{
1− exp [(1− β) (W d −W r)]}× 100 (36)
where
W d ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCdt −
(
Ndt
)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
represents the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility in the economy under discre-
tion, and
W r ≡ E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
lnCrt −
(N rt )
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
=
1
1− β
[
lnC
r −
(
N
r)1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
]
is the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility associated with the economy under full
commitment. Recall that σ = 1 is the benchmark case in our paper.
Hence, under the Rotemberg case,
ξR =
{ {1− exp [(1− β) (WR −W r)]} × 100 , using LQ method{
1− exp [(1− β) (W dR −W r)]}× 100 , using projection method
and under the Calvo case,
ξC =
{ {1− exp [(1− β) (WC −W r)]} × 100 , using LQ method{
1− exp [(1− β) (W dC −W r)]}× 100 , using projection method
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C.4 The Model With Time-Varying Tax Rate
To indirectly introduce cost push shock, we consider the revenue tax τpt which is assumed
to follow the following autoregressive process,
ln (1− τpt) = (1− ρτp) ln (1− τp) + ρτp ln (1− τpt−1)− eτt
eτt
i.i.d∼ N (0, σ2τ)
With revenue tax τpt, the expected discounted sum of nominal profits under Rotem-
berg pricing is given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
Qt,t+s
[
(1− τpt)Pt(j)Yt(j)−mctYt(j)Pt − φ
2
(
Pt(j)
Pt−1(j)
− 1
)2
YtPt
]
and under Calvo it can be written as
Et
∞∑
s=0
θsQt,t+s [(1− τpt)Pt(j)Yt+s(j)−mct+sYt+s(j)Pt+s]
Based on the derivation of the benchmark model, it is quite straightforward to write
down the complete system of non-linear equations describing the discretionary equilibri-
um. We will use Chebyshev collocation with time iteration method to solve the models
with time-varying tax for optimal policy functions.
C.4.1 Rotemberg Pricing
Since we want to focus on the effect of tax rate, then the technology shock can be shut
down by setting At ≡ 1. This, in fact, can simplify numerical computation.
The Lagrangian is
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (τpt+1)] + λ1t
{[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Nt − Ct
}
+ λ2t
{
(1− )(1− τpt) + Cσt Nϕt − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβCσt Y −1t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
where λjt (j = 1, 2) are the Lagrange multipliers, and
M(τpt+1) ≡ C−σt+1Nt+1Πt+1 (Πt+1 − 1)
The equilibrium conditions for time-consistent policy are,
C−σt = λ1t − λ2t
{
σCσ−1t N
ϕ
t + σφβC
σ−1
t N
−1
t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
Nt
ϕ = λ1t
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
+ λ2t
{
ϕNt
ϕ−1Cσt
−φβCσt N−2t Et [M(τpt+1)]
}
λ1tφ (1− Πt)Nt = λ2tφ (2Πt − 1)
Ct =
[
1− φ
2
(Πt − 1)2
]
Nt
0 = (1− )(1− τpt) + Cσt Nϕt − φΠt (Πt − 1) + φβ
Cσt
Nt
Et [M(τpt+1)] .
41
C.4.2 Calvo Pricing
Similar to the Rotemberg case, we solve a simpler question by shutting down the tech-
nology shock. Then, there are two state variables, τpt and ∆t−1. The Lagrangian is given
as follow:
L = C
1−σ
t − 1
1− σ −
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
+ βEt [V (∆t, τpt+1)]
+ λ1t[Nt/∆t − Ct]
+ λ2t
[
(1− τpt) Nt
∆tCσt
+ θβEt [L(∆t, τpt+1)]− Ft
]
+ λ3t
[
Nϕ+1t
(1− −1)∆t + θβEt [M(∆t, τpt+1)]− St
]
+ λ4t
[
(1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
−1
+ θΠt∆t−1 −∆t
]
+ λ5t
[
Ft
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
− St
]
where λjt (j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) are the Lagrange multipliers, and
L(∆t, τpt+1) ≡ Π−1t+1Ft+1
M(∆t, τpt+1) ≡ Πt+1St+1
The equilibrium conditions for time-consistent policy are,
Ct = Nt/∆t
Ft = (1− τpt)C1−σt + θβEt
[
Π−1t+1Ft+1
]
St =
Nϕ+1t
(1− −1)∆t + θβEt
[
Πt+1St+1
]
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
−1
+ θΠt∆t−1
St = Ft
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
0 = 1− λ1tCσt − σ(1− τpt)λ2t
0 = ∆tC
σ
t Nt
ϕ − Cσt λ1t − (1− τpt)λ2t −
(ϕ+ 1)Cσt N
ϕ
t λ3t
(1− −1)
0 = λ2t − λ5t
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
1−
0 = λ3t + λ5t
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0 = 
((
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 1
−1
−∆t−1Πt
)
λ4t
− 1
1− θ
(
1− θΠt−1
1− θ
) 
1−
λ5tFt
0 =
Ct
∆t
λ1t + (1− τpt)C
1−σ
t
∆t
λ2t +
Nϕt Ct
(1− −1)∆tλ3t
+ λ4t − θβλ2tEt [L1(∆t, τpt+1)]− θβλ3tEt [M1(∆t, τpt+1)]− θβEt
[
Πt+1λ4t+1
]
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Figure 3: This figure shows the effect of monopolistic distortion under Rotemberg pricing. The monopolistic distortion is
measured by markup at the deterministic steady state with zero inflation rate. The results from LQ and projection method
are compared.
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Figure 4: This figure shows the effect of monopolistic distortion under Calvo pricing. The monopolistic distortion is
measured by markup at the deterministic steady state with zero inflation rate. The results from LQ and projection method
are compared.
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